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RECENT DECISIONS
ADOPTION-DUTY or NATURAL FATHER To SUPPORT INDIGENT ADULT CHILD A rm
ADOPTION.-The plaintiff, an adult child, unable to earn a living because she was
incapacitated, brought the instant action against her natural father for support. She
had previously been adopted by her maternal grandparents who were no longer able
to support her, and she was likely to become a public charge. On appeal from an
order granting the plaintiff's petition, held, two justices dissenting, that the natural
father's duty of support is still binding despite the adoption where the adoptive parent
is unable to support the child and the natural parent is so able. Order affirmed.
Betz v. Horr, 250 App. Div. 457, 294 N. Y. Supp. 546 (1st Dep't 1937).
The conclusion is irresistible that with reference to the relation arising from adop-
tion' the policy of the law has been to extend to it the incidents of the relationship
of parent and child existing by nature.2 By statute3 and judicial decision 4 the child
has been permitted to take the name of the adoptive parent, to inherit from and be
supported by him and is placed completely under his control and supervision. The
ties which bound the child to his natural parents have been substantially severed;
up to the instant case the sole remaining bond had been the child's right to inherit
from his natural parents.5 In legal effect the child has become the natural child of the
adoptive parents.
But now it appears that still another obligation is placed upon the natural parent
towards his child; for by the present case, the court casts the duty of support back
upon the natural parents rather than upon the state 'when the natural parent can
support the child, and the foster parents are destitute.6 In an earlier New York
case, Carpenter v. Buffalo General Electric Company,7 the problem was to determine
who should recover damages for the death of an adopted child, the natural father
or relatives by adoption. In refusing the natural father's claim the court said that
"the death of the foster parent did not re-establish the relation of parent and child
1. Adoption is purely statutory; it was unknown at common law. Purinton v. Jamrock,
195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802 (1907); Sarazin v. Union Railway Co., 153 Mo. 579, 55 S. W.
92 (1900) ; In re Monroe's Executors, 132 Misc. 279, 229 N. Y. Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
Being wholly statutory, the nature of adoption depends upon the given statute, and not upon
judicial infiltration.
2. N. Y. Doir. REL. LAw (1909) § 113 states that "the person to be adopted shall hence-
forth be regarded in all respects as the child of the foster parent."
3. As early as 1896, the New York Legislature declared that "the foster parent or parents
and the minor sustain toward each other the legal relation of parent and child and have
all the rights, and are subject to all the duties of that relation ... " (N. Y. Laws 1896,
c. 272; N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (1896) § 64).
The above mentioned section is now embodied in the present N. Y. Dom. Rr.L. LAW
(1909) § 114.
4. Scott v. Peters, 87 Ind. App. 1, 158 N. E. 490 (1927) (permits adopted child to take
name of adoptive parent); Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N. W. 330 (1907) (adopted
child under control and supervision of adoptive parents); U. S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150
App. Div. 621, 135 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1st Dep't 1912) (adopted child inherits from adoptive
parent); Wertz v. Wertz, 123 Ore. 667, 263 Pac. 911 (1928) (adopted child supported by
adoptive parent).
5. N. Y. Domr. REr. LAw (1909) § 114. The purpose of this section is to prevent parents
from casting off unwanted children and thus depriving them of their rightful inheritance.
6. An interesting discussion of this point appears in Comment (1937) 17 B. U. L. REV.
91.
7. 213 N. Y. 101, 106 N. E. 1026 (1914), Ann. Cas. 1916C 754.
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between the natural parent and the intestate (the adopted child)."8 Obviously an
unreasonable situation, inter partes at least, is created in the law by the Carpentcr
case and the instant case. The natural parent is forced to support the child while
the relatives by adoption retain the right of inheriting from that child.0 But the
unfavorable position of the natural parent is considerably mitigated when it is noted,
as the majority says, that the primary duty rests upon the adoptive parents.
Strong support for the dissenting opinion is available in Section 114 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law. Therein it is expressly stated that the natural parents
after adoption are relieved "from all parental duties toward and of all responsibility
for ... such child. . ... 1o The only exception, the child's right to inherit from
the natural parent, is specifically included in the section. How the court can legally
justify imposing the duty of support upon the natural parent in view of the statute
is difficult to understand. It seems strained to base such a decision on economic and
moral grounds when the policy of the legislature appears to relieve the natural parents
of all duties after the adoption.
Considering this problem strictly from the moral standpoint, the decision is un-
doubtedly just. The natural law places upon all parents the inalienable, hence abso-
lute, duty of physically, intellectually and morally developing and educating their
children. There can be no complete release from such a duty." In support of its
argument, the court invokes this natural law. It reasons that the legislature did not
intend the natural parent to be released from his duty to support his adult child, for
to assume that it did would indicate that the legislature's intent was contrary to the
natural law. Yet the court will no doubt admit that the legislature intended adoption
to be the severance of the natural relationship of parent and child and the substi-
tution of an artificial legal relationship. If the legislature intended to legalize adop-
tion, which is not in strict accord with the natural law, there is no reason for the
court to suppose that it did not intend to relieve the natural parent of an inalienable
moral duty.
It must be agreed that neither exceptions nor additional rights may be read into
the statute by judicial legislation.' 2 Apparently the court, faced by an original prob-
lem, overlooked this principle. That the corporation counsel assisted in the prepara-
tion of the respondent's briefs indicates how completely the public interest was in-
volved in the case. That this interest was economic is obvious when it is realized
that the respondent would become a public charge if the appellant were not ordered
to contribute to her support by the court. With this in mind it is easier to under-
stand the decision.
S. 213 N. Y. 101, 103, 106 N. E. 1026, 1028 (1914).
9. Whether a natural parent could recover from the adopted parent for monies spent
for support of the child after the adoption under the principles of quasi-contract is dif-
ficult to answer. There is an indication that he cannot in McNemar v. McNemar, 137 Ill.
App. 504 (1907). But there has been an indication that recovery will be allowed, although
not on principles of quasi-contract. Greenman v. Gillerman's Estate, 188 Mich. 74, 154
N. W. 82 (1915).
10. The common law failed to enforce the duty to support an indigent adult child. People
v. Hill, 163 11. 18, 46 N. E. 796 (1896). However, in New York, by Punric W=zr-
LAW (1936) § 125, it is required that the parents or dose relatives, if able, shall support the
child.
11. The right and duty of educating and developing the child in all its capacities is
inalienable and its violation is an offense against commutative justice. See Cox, Lrnmr-
ITs UsE Am Aausa (1937).
12. See In re Monroe's Executors, 132 Misc. 279, 280, 229 N. Y. Supp. 476, 478 (Surr. Ct.
1928).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER TO REGULATE OPEN HOURS IN BARBER SIIOPS-
An ordinance was passed by the City of Detroit providing for the inspection, regula-
tion, and licensing of barber shops, including a measure which stipulated that barber
shops were to be open only between 8 a. m. and 7 p. In., except on Saturdays and
days preceding legal holidays. From a decree of the Wayne Circuit Court enjoining
enforcement of the ordinance, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of
Michigan. On appeal, held, two judges dissenting, that such part of the ordinance
as pertained to the fixing of open hours for barber shops was void as not being within
the police power. Judgment affirmed. Eanes v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 272
N. W. 896 (1937).
The conflict in cases like the principal case is between the police power of the state
and the due process clause of the Constitution. Recognition of police power as a
separate classification of a distinct group of powers probably began with the concept
of sovereignty in the seventeenth century.' In America, although the phrase "police
power" was used by Chief Justice Marshall as early as 1827,2 it was not until 1851
that the term was taken up by the state courts and defined in Commonwealth v.
Alger.3  In this case, Chief Justice Shaw conceded that the police power had
limits; and in a later case, Wynehamer v. People,4 its eventual constitutional check, the
due process clause, began to be recognized as a barrier against the unrestrained power
of government. 5 In 1876,6 the United States Supreme Court allowed a state to
make a reasonable regulation of a business "affected with a public interest," but im-
plied that had the regulation been unreasonable it would not have been allowed.
In transition the exercise of police power has been constantly counterbalanced by
considerations of due process of law. From the "public peace and economy" of
Blackstone, the definition of police power has been narrowed "to promote the order,
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society within constitutional limits." 7
The elasticity of the definition of police power is well known and desirable, 8 and
the Supreme Court has evidenced a similar disinclination to prescribe exact limits
to the scope of the due process clause.9
1. 4 BL. Comm. *162. "Public policy and economy" are discussed as attributes of sov-
ereignty and under them are mentioned many regulations recognized today as being under
the police power.
2. See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 443 (U. S. 1827). The police power Is re-
ferred to in this case, but only in a general manner. Morr, Duz PRocEss oF LAW (1926)
§ 113.
3. 7 Cush. 53, 85 (Mass. 1851) (in effect, police power is the power vested in the legisla-
ture by the Constitution to make wholesome, reasonable laws not repugnant to the Consti-
tution for the good and welfare of the people and the Commonwealth).
4. 13 N. Y. 378 (1856) (law allowing destruction of liquor unless kept in a residence
declared invalid as violation of due process clause).
5. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851), cited supra note 3, having declared
the police power to be based on the common law, the road was now open to point out the
fact that its main restriction, the due process clause, was also based on the common law
and that it was a substantive limit to the police power.
6. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
7. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299 (1899).
8. "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the public
needs.... It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the pre-
vailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary
to the public welfare." Holmes, J., in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111
(1911).
9. Due process of law is difficult to define and the Supreme Court has declared Its In-
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The location of the boundary line between the due process clause and the police
power is the point of dissension between the majority and minority opinions in
the principal case. An answer to the question whether the statute in the principal
case violates due process may best be made by divining the purpose of the law.
An analysis of the present opinions reveals that three different theories, with
respect to the statute in question, are possible. One theory suggests that the statute
be supported on the ground that it regulates hours of labor.10 In the cases concerning
the regulation of hours of labor, the justification or denunciation of the particular
law was based on the question whether the subject matter of the statute, was suffi-
ciently related to the public health. In 1905,11 a maximum hour law for bakers in
New York was declared invalid by the Supreme Court in a five to four decision.
But, in 1908,12 a maximum hour law for women in Oregon was upheld by the same
court. And, in 1917,13 the Supreme Court upheld the legislative power to regulate
any person's hours of labor in the interest of health. Thus, the trend of decisions
justifies the implication that the instant ordinance is constitutional if it was properly
classified as an hours of labor measure. It would seem that the objective of the
statute was not to regulate hours of labor. It is possible, as the majority opinion in
the principal case points out, to prevent overworking employees in all-night barber
shops simply by compelling employers to work their employees in shifts of a
maximum number of hours.14 Regulating hours of labor does not seem to be the
purpose of the statute in the instant case.
Can this statute be supported, then, on the theory that it is a sanitation law?15
The majority of the past decisions would lead one to believe that it can not. True,
New Jersey' 6 and Ohio 17 have upheld the validity of ordinances setting the closing
hours for barber shops, each declaring that it was impossible to properly inspect
barber shops at night. But at least five statesIs have declared such statutes to be
invalid, holding that the closing of barber shops was inadequately connected with the
public health and was unreasonable, arbitrary, and contrary to the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Supporting by analogy the view of New Jersey and Ohio are the cases upholding
tention not to define it, but to ascertain the intent and application of such an important
phrase in the Federal Constitution by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion as the cases presented for decision shal require. Mfunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113 (1876).
10. See Eanes v. City of Detroit, 279 Alich. 531, 536, 272 N. W. 896, 897 (1937), where
the majority opinion said the ordinance goes beyond the regulation of hours. But see id.
at 541, 272 N. W. at 899 (1937), where Justice Bushnell, dissenting, said it was a regula-
tion of hours of labor. Also, see id. at 563, 272 N. W. at 909 (1937), where Justice Potter,
dissenting, agrees with Justice Bushnell
11. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
12. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
13. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917).
14. See 279 Nfich. 531, 536, 272 N. W. 896, 897 (1937).
15. See id. at 536, 272 N. W. at 897 (1937), where majority opinion dismises smltation
theory. But see id. at 555, 272 N. W. at 905 (1937), where Justice Potter said that "the
ordinance in question is clearly a sanitary measure".
16. Falco v. Atlantic City, 99 N. 3. L. 19, 122 Ad. 610 (1923).
17. Wilson v. Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N. E. 187 (1934).
18. Ganley v. Claeys, 2 Cal. (2d) 266, 40 P. (2d) 817 (1935); State ex rel. Pavlil- v.
Johannes, 194 Minm. 10, 259 N. W. 537 (1935); Knight v. Johns, 161 M1ss. 519, 137 So.
509 (1931); Patton v. Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 38 P. (2d) 364 (1934); State ex rel.
Newman v. Laramie, 40 Wyo. 74, 275 Pac. 106 (1929).
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the power of the state to regulate the open hours for pawnbrokers,10 pool rooms,20
and jewelry auctions.21  Granting that the application of the sanitary theory is
rejected generally in relation to barber shops by the state courts, it has yet to come
before the United States Supreme Court. And in view of the gradual transition
discernible in the judicial recognition of hours of labor statutes and the minimum
wage laws now declared constitutional,22 it is not without the realm of possibility
that the sanitation theory might eventually be adopted.
Finally, is the statute to be supported on the theory that it is designed to break
chain store monopoly? 23 This contention is ably set down in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Bushnell in the instant case. The basic principle of Mirnn i.. Illllnois-
that the state may regulate a business affected with a public interest-has some
bearing on the present problem. In two celebrated cases, Barbier V. Connolly24 and
Soon Hing v. Crowley,25 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of ordinances which
regulated the open hours of laundries. It is submitted that the ordinance concerned
in Soon Hing v. Crowley was really directed at the Chinese monopoly in the laundry
trade, gained by low prices and almost continual labor.20 The danger to the small
shops from chain barber shops lies in the fact that most of the small individually
owned shops would lose their customers if they did not remain open as long as the
chain shops and the large independent shops which can work their barbers in shifts.
The small shop owners cannot successfully operate in shifts, and, consequently, are
at an economic disadvantage.
Again, it is to be noted that the Supreme Court has declared chain stores to be
different fundamentally from individually owned stores,27 and has upheld repeated-
ly28 the validity of various taxes applied specifically to them. Admitting the differ-
19. Hyman v. Boldrick, 153 Ky. 77, 154 S. W. 369 (1913) (to aid the police in pre-
venting thieves from disposing of their loot).
20. Tarkio v. Cook, 121 Mo. 1, 255 S. W. 202 (1894) (for such places were deemed to
be vicious in their tendencies).
21. Biddies v. Enright, 239 N. Y. 354, 146 N. E. 625 (1925) (because of the difficulty
in seeing the quality of the goods being sold under artificial light).
22. The validity of minimum wage laws was upheld by an equal vote. Stettler v. O'Hara,
-243 U. S. 629 (1917). Then, in two cases, such laws were declared invalid. Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298
U. S. 587 (1936). Finally, the regulation of wages for women and minors was allowed in
a case which overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, and the court said, in effect,
that there was no real difference between the regulation of minimum wages and the regula-
tion of maximum hours. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
23. See Eanes v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 539, 272 N. W. 896, 899 (1937), where
Justice Bushnell said it was the underlying purpose of the statute. See also id. at 565,
272 N. W. at 909 (1937), where Justice Potter refers to chain store monopoly.
24. 113 U. S. 27 (1885).
25. 113 U. S. 703 (1885).
26. See Patton v. Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 582, 38 P. (2d) 364, 370 (1934), where
Justice Blake, dissenting, drew an analogy between chain barber shops and the laundry
-monopoly concerned in Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703 (1885) and refers to the
court's remarks in that case concerning the government's "right to protect all persons from
-the physical and moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor".
27. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931).
28. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 284 U. S. 575 (1931); Girard Life Ins.
,Co. v. Pennsylvania, 287 U. S. 570 (1932); Nat'l Linen Service Corp. v. Lynchburg, 291
U. S. 641 (1934) ; Carter v. Burnett, 294 U. S. 697 (1935); Banner Cleaners and Dyers Inc.
v. Louisana, 299 U. S. 505 (1936).
RECENT DECISIONS
ence between the police power and the power of taxation and without attempting an
analogy, is it not reasonable to consider the regulation of chain stores or any other
economic danger to the public welfare as being controllable under the police power
when the legislature reasonably deems it exists? The legislature, supposed ex-
pression of the will of the people, may rightfully pass any reasonable laws which
do not conflict with the Constitution. 9 Presumption must be in favor of validity.20
It is submitted that the trend of the legislatures is toward the curbing of chain
store monopoly, and that in view of the above consideration the court might well
have upheld the constitutionality of the open hours measure for barber Shops as
being within the police power.
CORPORATIONs-RiGHT To APPEAR N PEnsoN.-In an action to foreclose a mortgage
on real property, the defendant corporation served a notice of appearance and an
answer subscribed in its corporate name as appearing in person. Plaintiff moved for
an order striking out this answer upon the ground that a corporation cannot defend
an action in person. Held, motion granted. The statute" providing that "a party
who is of full age" may prosecute or defend a civil action in person unless be has been
judicially declared to be incompetent is indicative of an intent to exclude minors,
incompetents and corporations from those entitled to prosecute or defend civil
actions in person. M1ortgage Commission of New York v. Great Neck Improrement
Co., 162 Misc. 416, 295 N. Y. Supp. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
Public policy, the conception of which might change tomorrow, is molding the
law of today and it has shaped as the unanimous American holding the rule that a
corporation cannot practice law.2 This same policy appears at times to confuse the
question, "Can a corporation practice law?" with the question, "Can a corporation
appear in person?", and assumes that as soon as the first question is answered, the
second is settled. In condemning a corporation for attempting to appear in person
a partial reliance upon the rationale of statutes3 which forbid the corporate practice
of law is found in judicial opinion. Other courts, and it would seem more cor-
recly, base their decision upon their conception of a corporation as a fictitious
entity functionally incapable of appearing in person.5 The court in the principal
29. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885).
30. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U. S. 592 (1899).
1. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr (1920) § 236.
2. The practice of law being a personal calling, it is obvious that a corporation cannot
fulfill the conditions decreed by statute for those who wish to become members of the bar.
Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932). Nor may a corporation practice
law indirectly by employment of a staff of lawyers. People v. Stock Yards State Bank, 344
111. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931) ; In re Maclub of America, 3 N. E. (2d) 272, 105 A. L. R. 1364
(Mass. 1936); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930); In ro Co-operative Law
Co., 19S N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910), 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) S5 (1911). Of course a corpora-
tion may retain lawyers in connection with its own business. In re Otternes3, 181 Minn. 2S4,
232 N. W. 318 (1930). For a full discussion see Wormser, Corporations and the Pracice of
Law (1936) 5 FoRoH= L. Ry. 207; Hxcrs & KA=z, UNAumlonxzm PRMcTca or LAw
(1934).
3. For typical statutes see ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, §§ 411-415;
MAss. ANN. LAws (1933) c. 221, § 46; N. Y. PENAL LAw (1909) § 280.
4. Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1934).
S. Most American courts agree that a corporation cannot appear in person but must
appear by a duly licensed attorney. United Securities Corp. v. Pantex Pressing Mach. Inc.,
1937]
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case searches the methods of appearance permissible under the Civil Practice
Act 6 and decides that corporate appearance in person is not sanctioned. The
reasoning upon which the court supports its decision is largely an argument
from statutory interpretation, but it likewise involves the analysis of the nature of
the corporate entity. It stands finally in direct conflict with the holding of a New
York court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in Sellent-Repent Corp. v. Queens Borough,
etc., Co.7 Relying on Section 280 of the Penal Law, the latter case decided8 that
when a corporation does not go outside its own corporate machinery in the perform-
ance of a corporate act, it is acting in person and upon an equal footing with a
natural person, and may appear in person. Thus the New York law stands unsettled.
The instant decision seems stronger than the opposite holding of the Sellent-
Repent case in all respects. In the present case the defendant argued that Section
280 of the Penal Law, which makes it a misdemeanor for a corporation to practice or
appear as an attorney-at-law for any person other than itself, granted by clear
implication the right of a corporation to prosecute and defend actions in person.
It may be admitted that under the wording of the Penal Law a corporation can-
-not be prosecuted for attempting to appear in person.0  But does it necessarily
follow that because a corporation cannot be convicted under a particular section
of the Penal Law for attempting to appear in person that it therefore has the right
to do so? Remembering that the statute in question is penal and was designed to
put a stop to an improper practice, not to grant a right, the answer should be in
the negative.10
'98 Colo. 79, 53 P. (2d) 653 (1935) [construing CoLo. COMP. STAT. (1921) §§ 6017, 5997,
similar to N. Y. PENAL LAW § 270]; Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 F.
Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1934) [construing 36 STAT. 1164 (1911) 28 U. S. C. A. § 394 (1934)
similar to N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac (1921) § 236] (in this case the corporate entity theory was
also a ground of decision) ; Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 Pac. 718 (1923) ;
Nixon v. South Western Ins. Co., 47 Ill. 444 (1868), overruling Mineral Point R. R. v. Keep,
22 Ill. 9 (1859) ; Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1937) [construing Mo. STAT. ANN.
(Vernon, 1932) §§ 11693, 11694 similar to N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 270]; New Jersey
Photo Engraving Co. v. Carl Schonert & Sons, Inc., 95 N. J. Eq. 12, 122 AtI. 307 (1923);
Finox Realty Corp. v. Lippman, N. Y. L. J. May 12, 1937, p. 2375, col. 3; 10th St. & 5th
Ave. Inc. v. Naughton, N. Y. L. J. June 21, 1937, p. 3117, col. 3. Cf. Cary & Co. v. F. E.
Satterlee & Co., 116 Minn. 507, 208 N. W. 408 (1926). See Commercial & R. R. Bank v.
Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60, 65 (U. S. 1840); Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 737, 829,
830 (U. S. 1824) ; Union Pacific Ry. v. Homey, 5 Kan. 340, 347, 348 (1870).
6. N.Y. Crv. PRAa Acr (1921) § 236: "A party who is of full age may prosecute or defend
a civil action in person or by attorney unless he has been judicially declared to be incompetent
to manage his affairs."
7. 160 Misc. 920, 290 N. Y. Supp. 887 (Sup. Ct. 1936), (1936) 37 CoL. L. REV. 313,
Since the question had not yet been passed upon by the Appellate Courts and in view of the
,decision in the Sellent-Repent case, motion was stayed in the instant case pending defendant's
appeal to the Appellate Division. Mortgage Commission of New York v. Great Neck Im-
-provement Co., 162 Misc. 416, 422, 295 N. Y. Supp. 107, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
8. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 280: "It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary
association to practice or appear as an attorney-at-law for any person other than Itself In any
-court in this state or before any judicial body, or to make it a business to practice as an
attorey-at-law, for any person other than itself, in any of said courts."
9. This concession was made by the court in the present case. Id. at 419, 295 N. Y. Supp.
at 111: "It is true, a corporation may not be prosecuted under this section for interposing an
answer in its own name, as a defendant in person."
10. See People v. Purdy, 174 App. Div. 694, 695, 162 N. Y. Supp. 70, 71 (1st Dep't 1916),
-rev'd on other grounds, 221 N. Y. 481, 116 N. E. 390 (1917).
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A consideration of the common law and statutes in pari matcria bears out the
court's contention that a corporation does not have the right to appear in person.11
At early common law both plaintiff and defendant were required to appear in person. 2-
A corporation, however, was considered incapable of personal appearance and was
required to appear by an attorney-at-law.13 Perhaps in the instant case the court
went too far in holding that the wording of the Civil Practice Act14 was indicative
of an intent to exclude minors, incompetents and corporations from that group
which is given the right of personal appearance. Certainly, however, Section 236
does not contain ark affirmative grant of such power to a corporation.10 Thus the
common law which refuses the right of a corporation to appear in person remains
unchanged.
Article VIII, Section 3 of the New York Constitution, which provides "that
all corporations shall have the right to sue and shall be subject to be sued, in all
courts in like cases as natural persons," does not demand a different conclusion.1
This provision does not affect Section 236 of the New York Civil Practice Act; it con-
firms a corporation in its right to sue and subjects it to suit; it does not define the
manner of appearance by the corporation in such actions. Section 236 of the NEw
Yop. CIV. PRACTICE AcT which provides methods of appearance does not sanction
the method invoked by the defendant corporation.
What appears to be the strongest argument in favor of the instant decision, over-
looked by the court in the Sellent-Repent case, is the fact that there is involved a
violation of Section 270 of the Penal Law.' 7 This section forbids one not an attorney
to appear for a person other than himself. It does not appear that the officer of the
11. "Every statute must be interpreted in the light of (1) the subject-matter with which
it deals; (2) the reason or purpose behind its enactment as found in the text and the evil
towards which it was directed (including here extrinsic aids and the common law); and (3)
the meanings of the several other relevant parts of the same statute or of statutes in ari
inateria:" De Sloov~re, Contextual Interpretation of Statutes (1936) S FoRn oA. L. R-v. 219.
12. 3 BL. CoMMas. *25. See Cooley v. Lawrence, 12 How. Pr. 176, 182 (N. Y. 1855). An
appearance by attorney was later sanctioned. Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 ENv7. I, c. 10.
13. See Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 830 (U. S. 1824); 1 CmrT, PLZU-
iG (1859) *551; Coirysrs' DiGs (1780) Pleader 2 B. 2; 2 Km.N-rs Coamr. *291.
14. See supra, note 5.
15. See Mlullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1934)
(holding that a corporation cannot plead and manage its case personally or through an
agent not an attorney as provided in 36 STAT. 1164 (1911) 28 U. S. C. A. 394 (1934), which
statute corresponds to the N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr (1921) § 236).
16. Originally corporations as part of the sovereign could neither sue nor be sued. Later
they were allowed to do both. The Constitution of New York embodies this rule. It gives
to corporations the same protection and subjects them to the same liability which would
devolve upon an individual under the same circumstances. Williams v. Village of Port
Chester, 97 App. Div. 84, 89 N. Y. Supp. 671 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd 183 N. Y. 550, 76 N. E.
1116 (1905).
17. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) § 270: "It shall be unlawful for any person to practice or
appear as an attorney-at-law or as attorney and counselor-at-law for another in a court of
record in this state or in any court in the City of New York . . . without having first been
duly and regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this
state." Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mlo. 1937); United Securities Corp. v. Pantex
Pressing Mach. Inc., 98 Colo. 79, 53 P. (2d) 653 (1935) [construing Colo. Comp. Stat.
(1921) §§ 6017, 5997, similar to N. Y. Penal Law (1909) § 270 to mean that a corporation
can appear in a court of record only by an attorney-at-law].
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defendant corporation in the case at bar is a licensed attorney;18 he is not acting in
his own cause but in the cause of the corporation which is a distinct person. He
therefore acts in violation of the Penal Law. It should be remembered that although
a corporation must by its very nature act in all its affairs through its officers and
agents it still remains a legal entity, separate and apart fron those who control it.1o
Every time a corporation functions there are two acts performed in the eyes of
the law: the act of the corporation and that of the officer or agent for the corpora-
tion. When a corporation commits a crime, or a civil wrong like libel or slander, the
active agent as well as the corporation is liable.20 It is this officer's or agent's act which
the Penal Law forbids when he is not an attorney. And the act of the corporation may
not be done if it is inseparable from an illegal act. The Sellent-Repen opinion, while
it claims that a corporation is acting in person "when it does not go outside of its
own corporate machinery"-i.e., when it acts only through its own officers-fails
to recognize that under the Penal Law the officer is powerless, in this instance, law-
fully to act for the corporation. Should the officer attempt to act for the corpora-
tion his action is illegal and that of his corporate principal ineffectual and void.
INTERPLEADER-APPLICATION TO STATE INHERITANCE TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONAL
QUEsTIoNS.-Decedent died leaving considerable intangible property. His will was
admitted to probate in Massachusetts and ancillary proceedings were instituted in
California by the complainant, the executor under the will. In both states proceed-
ings were started for the purpose of collecting inheritance taxes from the estate, the
tax officials of each claiming that the decedent was domiciled in their respective
states at the time of his death. The complainant thereupon filed a bill in the nature
of a bill of interpleader' in the Federal District Court of Massachusetts joining the
tax officials of the two states as parties defendant. The bill pursuant to the Federal
Interpleader Act2 prayed for a determination of the domicil of the decedent, a
permanent injunction against the officials of the non-domiciliary state forbidding any
action to collect the tax, and the discharge of all liability to both defendants upon
the compliance by the complainant with the court's decree as to which official is
18. See Mortgage Commission of New York v. Great Neck Improvement Co., 162 Misc,
416, 418, 295 N. Y. Supp. 107, 109 (1937).
19. The members and the corporation are distinct legal persons. 1 BL. CozMM. *475. Cf.
Cary & Co. v. F. E. Satteree & Co., 166 Minn. 507, 203 N. W. 408 (1926). See Canfield, The
Scope & Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 128.
20. Keller v. American Bottlers' Pub. Co., 140 App. Div. 311, 125 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1st
Dep't 1910); Pfister v. Sentinel Co., 108 Wis. 572, 84 N. W. 887 (1901).
1. The distinction between a bill of interpleader (often called a strict bill) and a bill
in the nature of a bill of interpleader is that the latter lies when there is shown in addition
to multiple vexation, some other special ground for equitable relief; for examplo, the admin-
istration of a trust or the cancellation of an instrument for fraud. Chafee, The Federal
Interpleader Act of 1936: I (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 963, 970.
2. jurisdiction to entertain the bill was asserted under the Federal Interpleader Act of
1936 which gives the district courts nationwide jurisdiction in suits begun by "bills in the
nature of interpleader ... filed by any person ... having in his ... custody or possession
money or property . . . if two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states, are
claiming to be entitled to such money or property . . . although the titles or claims of tho
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical but are adverse to
and independent of one another". 49 STAT. 1096, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (1936).
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entitled to the tax. On appeal from a decree granting an interlocutory injunction,3
held, one judge dissenting, that the relief asked for should be denied because the
bill was violative of the Eleventh Amendment and the provisions of the Federal
Interpleader Act. Injunction vacated. Ri y v. Worcester Coutty Trust Co., 89 F.
(2d.) 59 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937).
Here, two states claim to be the domicil of the decedent and demand the right
to tax his property. Since a man can have but one domicil at any time,4 the
intangible property being taxable only at that domicil, and since domicil is
determined by the law of the forum,0 the question is raised; which of the com-
peting states shall be adjudged to be the domicil and which court shall be the
arbiter of the adjudication? The interpleader was offered as the only possible
and practical solution of this perplexing problem.
7
The ancient equitable remedy of interpleader derives out of the right of a dis-
interested stakeholder, from whom two or more persons claim the same thing, debt,
or duty, to compel the conflicting claimants to come into one court and litigate
the matter among themselves without really involving him in their controversy.8
The rationale of interpleader is, that the stakeholder thereby avoids the vexation
of two or more suits with their consequent expense and the danger of his being
compelled to pay the same demand more than once.0 Since Equity usually acts
3. A motion by the California officials to dismiss the bill for lack of jurisdiction was re-
fused by the District Court and certiorari denied by the Supreme Court. Worcester County
Trust Co. v. Long, 14 F. Supp. 754 (D. D. Mass. 1936); Riley v. Worcester County Trust
Co., 299 U. S. 567 (1936); (1936) 49 HARV. L. Ray. 1378; (1936) 31 ILT. L. REv. 546.
4. United States ex rel. Thomas v. Day, 29 F. (2d) 485 (1928); Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y.
556 (1873); Matter of Lydig, 191 App. Div. 117, 180 N. Y. Supp. 843 (1st Dep't 1920);
Rourke v. Hanchett, 240 Mass. 557, 134 N. E. 355 (1922); RasT,%T=aT, CoruLir or L,ws
(1934) § 11; 1 BFsnE, Cozrszcr or Lvws (1935) § 11; Dicmz, Co:.rcr o. Lws (4th ed.
1927) 88.
5. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. r-ginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929); Farmers Loan and Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282
U. S. 1 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); First National Bank of Boston
v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
6. Matter of Bain, 104 Misc. 508, 172 N. Y. Supp. 604 (Surr. Ct. 1918); RE SATm ;r,
op. cit. supra, note 4, § 10 (1); BEAi.E op. cit. supra, note 4, § 10.1.
7. Professor Chafee proposes three methods: One method is to settle the controversy be-
tween the two states in the United States Supreme Court. This means that the esecutor
must fight each state separately in its own courts and after losing in the courts of last
resort in both states he must obtain writs of certiorari from the Supreme Court. The two
suits must then be so nicely timed that both will reach the court together and parhaps be
heard together and decided as a single controversy. This method has never been success-
fully put into operation. A second method was successfully used in Matter of Trowbridge,
266 N. Y. 283, 194 N. E. 756 (1935). There the State of Connecticut voluntarily sub-
mitted itself to the jurisdiction of the New York courts for the purpose of determining
the domicile of a decedent. This method of settling the question is not likely to be resorted
to very often because of unconscious bias by a particular state court in favor of its own
officials. The third method is interpleader. Chafee, The Federal Interpead cr Act of 193d:
1/ (1936) 45 YArE L. J. 1161, 1170.
8. Standley v. Roberts, 59 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894); 4 Poa~o, EQunt Jun-
PPauD - C (4th ed. 1919) § 1320; Standley v. Roberts, 59 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894).
9. For the essential elements of an interpleader suit, see 4 Poxurno i, EQurr" Juns-




in personam,o the use of the interpleader was unavailable for many years to
persons subjected to multiple suits by claims of citizens of different states. The
reason was that the state 1 and federal' 2 courts were unable to obtain the necessary
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident claimants who refused to submit them-
selves to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. Hence, an interpleader decree or in-
junction of a state court rendered without personal service would not be entitled to
full faith and credit in sister states.' s Thus, the interpleader was inadequate to
hurdle fixed legal state barriers.14 However, in 1917 Congress enlarged the juris-
diction of federal district courts in equity suits of interpleader by authorizing certain
classes of stakeholders to bring interpleader therein, and permitting the process of
the court to run into all parts of the United States.' 5 The progress of the interpleader
continued 16 and in 1936 the present Federal Interpleader Act was passed.
The district court decision in the case at bar was hailed as the solution of a
hitherto difficult and insoluble problem. But now the problem returns and as a
result of the instant holding, our system of state inheritance taxation remains in the
defective condition shown to exist by the famous Dorrance litigation. 1'
The principal difficulties involved in the present use of federal interpleader that
confronted the court were: (1) whether the suit attempts to interplead citizens of
two different states, or a citizen and a state, or two different states; (2) whether
the threatened collection of taxes in both states is in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; (3) whether an effective decree can issue if the suit is regarded as
brought against the officials as individuals.
10. Hart v. Sanson, 110 U. S. 151 (1884); Toller v. Cateret, 2 Vern. 494, 23 Eng. Re-
prints 916 (Ch. 1705); cf. Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928); 1
Pomxaoy, op. cit. supra, note 9, § 134.
11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy,
241 U. S. 518 (1916); Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. $66 (1921).
12. See Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 328 (U. S. 1838); Herndon v. Ridgway, 17
How. 424 (U. S. 1854); 36 STAT. 1101, 28 U. S. C. A. 110 (1927).
13. Consequently an injunction issued against the absentee claimant would not restrain
him from instituting action in the same court or in the courts of another jurisdiction. See
note 11, supra.
14. For a general discussion see, Chafee, Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
685.
15. 39 STAT. 929 (1917), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (1927) (under this act only insurance
companies and fraternal beneficiary societies were authorized to file bills of interpleader).
16. 43 STAT. 976 (1925) 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (1926) [through an error this act cut
down the powers of the district court to give relief; it was replaced the next year. 44 STAT.
416, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (1926) (for the first time the courts were authorized to enjoin
state proceedings)]. Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: 1 (1936) 45 YAL. L. 3.
963.
17. The Pennsylvania courts decided that the deceased was domiciled in Pennsylvania
and his executor paid the inheritance tax in that state. Afterward the New Jersey courts
decided that he was domiciled in New Jersey and an inheritance tax was paid there. New
Jersey also refused to let the executor deduct the Pennsylvania tax payment in computing
the net value of the estate taxable by New Jersey on the ground that the Pennsylvania
tax was an illegal transaction that must be disregarded.
The New Jersey series: In re Dorrance's Estate, 113 N. J. Eq. 266, 166 Ati. 177 (1933);
115 N. J. Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601 (1934); 116 N. J. Eq. 204, 172 Atl. 503 (1934), agt'd, 13
N. J. Misc. 168, 176 AUt. 902 (1935); 298 U. S. 678 (1935) cert. denied; 298 U. S. 692,
rehearing for cert. denied (1935) ; Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393 (1935). The Pennsylvania
series: Dorrance's Estate, 209 Pa. 151, 163 At]. 303 (1932); cert. denied, 287 U. S. 660
(1932), 288 U. S. 617 (1933).
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(1) It is well settled that suits against state officials to enjoin the enforcement
of a statute alleged to violate the constitution or to prevent the unconstitutional
administration of a valid statute are not suits against the state1 8 These suits are
sustained on the theory that such officials act in an individual capacity and not as
authorized agents of the state. The court in the instant case argued: since there was
no allegation of an unconstitutional tax statute in either state, and since the officials
of neither state were charged with having acted arbitrarily in determining the
question of domicil, the bill must be regarded as an attempt to interplead the two
states.'2 Inasmuch as a state is not a citizen of the United States, the bill is without
the provisions of the Act which requires the interpleading of citizens of different
states.2 ' Moreover, if the bill contemplated the interpleader of one or both states, it
would be in violation of the Constitution,22 for original jurisdiction in such cases is
conferred solely upon the Supreme Court; and, in addition, such compulsory joinder of
the states would offend the Eleventh Amendment,23 (2) Likewise, it is impossible to
lend support to the more basic argument that the actions of one of the states is in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mere inconsistent determination of domicil by
two states, without more, is not contrary to "due process." So long as the findings of
the two states were in compliance with their valid laws, any possible error made by one
or the other is "judicial error," protection from which is not guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.24 (3) If the bill is regarded as joining the tax officials of Cali-
fornia and Massachusetts as individuals, rather than the aforesaid states, another
jurisdictional difficulty is presented. Even if this theory is accepted, simce the
Interpleader Act 2s contemplates final determination of the controversy by an effective
decree discharging the stakeholder from liability to both states, it is obviously im-
perative that the real parties in interest, namely the states and not individuals,
be before the court.
The dissenting opinion approaches the instant problem from a realistic viewpoint.
Looking at taxation as a practical matter with the view of avoiding in the present
case the unjust and oppressive consequences of the Dorran c case,20 the minority
judge defends a liberal interpretation of the Interpleader Act in favor of jurisdiction.
18. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 737 (U. S. 1824); Poindexter v. Green-
how, 114 U. S. 270 (1884); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 (1899); Gunther v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 200 U. S. 273 (1906); Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1903);
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18 (1933);
(1937) 85 U. of PA. L. REV. 844.
19. The absence of such a charge against the officials of one state fails to raise the
federal question of deprivation of property without due process of law.
20. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430 (1886); Minnesota v. Northern Securities
Co., 194 U. S. 48 (1904); State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Utah Construction
Co., 278 U. S. 194 (1929); State Highway Commission in Arkansas v. Kansas City Bridge
Co., 81 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
21. The bill must interplead ".. . citizens of different states... ." See note 2, sup'a.
22. U. S. CONsT. Art. III, § 2.
23. U. S. Coxsr. Amendment XI. The majority opinion definitely stated that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the present suit. Riley v. Worcester County Trust Co., 89 F.
(2d) 59, 66 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937). So it seems that the hopes expressed by Professor Chafee
that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit of the instant type are shattered.
Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: 11 (1936) 45 YAX. L. 3. 1161, 1174.
24. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1895); Tracy v. Ginzberg, 205 U. S.
170 (1907); Milwaukee Electric Ry. v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 100 (1920).
25. 49 STAT. 1096, 28 U. S. C. A. 41 (26) (d) (Supp. 1936).
26. See note 17, supra.
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Fundamental concepts of justice would dictate that the estate of a decedent be
taxable in but one state, and to secure such justice is one of the basic purposes of
the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936. Nevertheless, the majority opinion correctly
states the fundamental objections to the use of the interpleader in this situation.
Despite the realistic dissent, considerations of convenience and practicality open
no channel of escape from the barrier of constitutional and statutory restrictions.
Such dissent, however, properly points to the need for a renewed attack upon the
evil of double taxation disclosed in the instant case. The attitude of the Supreme
Court27 in lessening this evil gives promise that a solution, consistent with constitu-
tional and statutory requirements, will be forthcoming.
LABOR LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY or ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE-The plaintiff was
a non-union contractor working in his own business, employing one or two helpers.
The defendant, a local union, endeavored to induce the plaintiff to unionize his
shop and to sign an agreement. Article III1 of this proposed agreement, would
have deprived the plaintiff of the right to work in his business. The plaintiff
refused to sign and the union picketed his place of business. Denied an injunction
because of the Wisconsin Labor Code, plaintiff appealed, contending that the
provisions of the Code which declare2 neaceful picketing lawful in a labor dispute
and prohibit granting an injunction against such conduct, violate, as construed and
applied in his case3 both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. On appeal, from the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, held, four judges dissenting, that the said statute is not unconstitutional.
Judgment affirmed. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 57 Sup. Ct. 858 (1937).
In the dawn of collective action by labor, the courts frowned on unions and
proceeded deftly to strangle their activity with the doctrines of conspiracy and re-
straint of trade.4 Soon, however, judicial decisions began to recognize the economic
27. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929); Farmers Loan and
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commis-
sion, 282 U. S. 1 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
1. Article III reads as follows: "No individual . . . engaged in the Contracting Business
shall work with tools or act as helper, but the installation of all materials . . . shall be
done by journeymen members of Tile Layers Protective Union Local No. $.'I The Con-
stitution and rules of the union, prohibited the plaintiff from membership, since he had not
served a three year apprenticeship.
2. Vis. STAT. (1935 § 103.53.
3. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the attempt of the'union to induce the
plaintiff to sign the said agreement constituted a "labor dispute" within the purview of the
statute. The United States Supreme Court stated that it was bound by the interpreta-
tion of the highest state court on this point. This proposition is later sustained in the
majority opinion when the court decided that this construction violated no constitutional
right of the plaintiff. If the interpretation of the state court invaded constitutional rights,
this state ruling would be subject to review by the Supreme Court. Coombs v. Getz, 285
U. S. 434 (1932). Cf. Thompson v. Boekbout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937);
see (1937) 46 YA.E L. J. 1064, 1070, n. 36; (1937) 50 HARv. L. REV. 1295, 1302, n. 38-39.
4. Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Waterhouse v. Comer,
55 Fed. 149 (C. C. W. D. Ga. 1893); WnaT=D, HISTORY OF CoNspsmCcY ANm ABUSE OF
LEGAL PRoCEDURE (1921); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922) 35 HARv. L. Rtv. 393.
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necessity for laborers banding together. 5 The courts conceded the right to strike
and picket for certain purposes, e.g., to secure increased wages and better conditions
of service.6 But what other ends are "lawful" ends for concerted union activity is a
question that has provoked a hopeless confusion of decisions in the various states.7
Generally, the "self-interest" s of the union, e.g., higher wages, has been used as
a test of the validity of the purpose of the strike. But how far this "self-interest"
will be permitted to encroach on the rights of others is a tangled problem. This
Gordian knot is not to bd cut by any ordinary jural weapon. As one writer puts it,
"the doctrine of the just cause or excuse inevitably operated so as to leave to
judges and juries the decision of questions not so much of law and fact as of
ethics and economics." So it is not surprising that "economic necessity" was the
ground in the case under consideration for deciding the issue of the legality of the
end sought by a strike. The majority of the court adopted the view that this end
of the union's activity was "not arbitrary or capricious but a reasonable rule
adopted by the defendants out of the necessities of employment and for the pro-
tection of themselves as workers and craftsmen in the industry,"'1 citing American
Steel Foundrieg v. Tri-City Council.?' Scrutinizing the basis of the decision, its eco-
nomic aspects, we find some pertinent facts. First, the end sought in this case is to
force the employer out of work in order to replace him with a union member.12
5. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); Commonwealth
v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111 (Mass. 1842); Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt (1932) 32 Cor. L. RR,.
1166.
6. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894); Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 62
Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894). See Bedford Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37, 47
(1927); Wabash Ry. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563, 575 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1903). For
certain exceptions to this rule, see Rosenwasser Bros. Inc. v. Pepper, 104 Misc. 457, 461,
172 N. Y. Supp. 310, 313 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; Mason, The Rltght to Stribe (1928) 77 U. or PA.
L. RLv. 52.
7. It is interesting to note the divergence concerning legality of union aims in two lead-
ing jurisdictions, Massachusetts and New York. Compare Folsom v. Lewis, 203 Mass. 336,
94 N. E. 316, 317 (1911); Snow Iron Works, Inc. v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N. F.
801 (1917); Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. Fa. 919 (1923),
where a strike for a closed shop is illegal, with Exchange Bakery & Restaurant Inc. v.
Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927); Co.arzn'r (1928) 40 HAnv. L. rv. 836,
where a strike for a closed shop is legal because the economic betterment of labor depends
on universal organization.
8. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 (190D); Folsom v. Lewis, 203 Mass.
336, 94 N. E. 316 (1911); National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63
N. E. 369 (1902); Irving v. Neal, 209 Fed. 471 (S. D. N. Y., 1913).
9. GaarAPR, THJE PREsFNT LAW oF TRADE DispuTrs %.No TnAnz U-oums p. 24; Holmes,
Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894) 8 HAiv. L. Rwv. 1, 8; cf. Haverhill Strand Theater
Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918) (whether a purpose is or is not lawful
is a question of law for the court).
10. See Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 57 Sup. Ct. 858, 863 (1937).
11. The court in American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921) does
say at page 209: "They [union] may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their member-
ship and esbecially among those whose labor at lower wages will injure the whole guild."
The soundness of such a statement must be conceded. It would seem, however, that this
statement begs our question. We are concerned with the problem of what constitutes "law-
ful' propaganda.
12. Such admission was in fact made by counsel for the defendants. Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union, 57 Sup. Ct. 858, 865.
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Second, the interest of the union in maintaining a high wage scale was not jeopardized
since the plaintiff agreed to hire only union men and to pay the union rate.18
Under our Constitution every man has the right to labor and conduct a business,
if he so chooses. 14  In Coppage v. Kansas,15 the Supreme Court stated that any
arbitrary interference with this right to work "is a substantial impairment of liberty
in the long-established constitutional sense." To the eye of the majority the necessity
that a union man be given work was reason enough to prevent the picketing from
being an "arbitrary" infringement of the plaintiff's right. What is reasonable and
what is arbitrary is to be determined in the light of all the circumstances. But it is
submitted that to permit the use of force 1 6-for picketing by a union is force, of a
more subtle but no less effective type than physical force--in order to put the em-
ployer out and to let a union man in, is taking the bread from one mouth to put it
into another, denying one man's economic necessity' to affirm another's. And the
title to the business is more justly placed in the man who made it, built up his
clientele and suffered its first hardships, than in the newcomer. In a somewhat
similar situation (a union threatened a strike if the employer did not dischargo
a certain employee) the Supreme Court in the American Foundries case17 thought
the end sought smacked too much of monopolistic tendencies, coercion, and remote-
ness of the legal purpose of the union to better its members' condition to be held
lawful. It would seem that the economic necessity argument which the court
favored in the instant case, would have been more harshly treated by the court in
the American Foundries case.
The instant case is interesting from another viewpoint. It appears that a union
is now attempting to assume a position of dictator over an employer. 18 Formerly
the unions confined their activity to restricting the employer in his dealings with his
employees, e.g., in the payment of wages and in the number of working hours.
Here it is attempting to wedge its way into the field of management by telling the
employer just what he may personally do, i.e., that he shall not work in his own
business. Suppose an employer hired ten union men to manufacture high grade
watches. The local union has thirty men out of work. The employer could hire
these remaining thirty men if he manufactured cheaper watches, due to the increased
volume made possible by such a change. Would economic necessity make it lawful
for the union to strike and picket if he did not do so?
13. Id. at 864.
14. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312
(1921) (right to run a business is a property right). "A man may not barter away his
life or his freedom, or his substantive rights." Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall.
445, 451 (U. S. 1874).
15. 236 U. S. 1, 14 (1914).
16. As a practical matter, picketing closely resembles forceful obstruction of access to
a place of business. Due to the constant association of violence with it in the newspaper
headlines, some customers often become apprehensive for their physical safety in the pres-
ence of pickets, and trade falls off as much from fear as from sympathy. See American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 195 (1921). "There is and can be no
such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be a chaste vulgarity, or peaceful
mobbing, or lawful lynching." Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582, 584
(C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905). But see Cooper, The Fiction of Peaciful Picketing (1936) 35
MIcE. L. REv. 73.
17. See note 11, supra.
18. A significant indication of what labor is attempting in regard to employers is found
in the remarks of John L. Lewis, Chairman of the Committee For Industrial Organization,
in his address at Pittsburgh: "Labor must become strong enough to take its place at the
council tables of industry." N. Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1937, p. 3, col. 1.
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The significance of this case then lies especially in the broadening of "labor dis-
pute" to include problems of individual conduct of managemenL As a condition
to recognition by a union, labor has now barred, with the benediction of the Supreme
Court, the employer from physically working in his own business. The announced
aim of labor for a place "at the council tables of industry"10 seems nearer realization.
LIBEL-FAIR COMNMNT-BURDEN OF PRoor.-Plaintiffs, mother and son, were
examined in the course of a referee's investigation into certain objectionable prac-
tices in the Magistrates' Courts. The object of the examination was to determine
the source of certain bank deposits made by the son, a police lieutenant, in the name
of the mother. At the conclusion of the hearing the referee, remarking upon the
evidence, announced his intention to pursue the investigation until it could be dis-
covered who ultimately received the money illegally collected from persons having
cases in the Magistrates' Courts. Defendant newspaper, commenting editorially on
the hearing and the testimony, printed an article the substance of which accused the
plaintiff son with having by means of "graft" succeeded in banking $237,865 in six
years on an annual salary of between $3,500 and $4,000. The article further derided
the mother's attempts to explain the source of the money deposited, drawing there-
from the inference that it had been dishonestly acquired. Subsequently the money
was shown to have been honestly acquired and plaintiffs brought separate actions for
libel. On appeal from a verdict in favor of the defendants, held, two justices dis-
senting, that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that defendants
had the burden of proving the article justified on the ground of privilege or fair
comment; the complaints showed on their faces that the occasion was a proper one
for fair comment and this relieved defendant of that burden, leaving it to plaintiffs
to show that defendant had gone beyond the bounds of fair criticism. Judgment
affirmed. Kenna v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 250 App. Div. 625, 295 N. Y. Supp. 219 (1st
Dep't 1937).
For a proper appreciation of the principle applied by the majority of the court
in the instant case it is helpful to examine the source from which it was drawn. In
holding that, although the defendant had set up the defense of privilege as allowed
by Section 337 of the Civil Practice Act, the burden of proof on that question lay
with the plaintiff, the majority opinion cited and quoted the Court of Appeals in
Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co~' There it was remarked that when the public
nature of the occasion appears on the face of the complaint "the law of fair comment
applies", whereas when only the libelous words are alleged without the setting or
occasion for the publication, the fact that it was written as a comment on a matter
of public interest "must be set forth in the answer as a defense-in the nature of a
special privilege".2 This statement by the court in the Hoeppner case was apparently
obiter dictum except as it tended to define fair comment; at any rate, so far as ap-
19. Ibid.
1. 254 N. Y. 95, 100, 162 N. E. 139, 140 (1930).
2. It is significant to note that in support of this proposition the Court in the Hoeppner
case cited but one authority, an English case, Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., Ltd., [1905]
2 K. B. 627. An examination of that case reveals that the statement was made by way of
analogy, and thus far at least was mere dictum, since the court was primarily concerned
with a consideration of malice in the law of comment as compared with its position in the
law of qualified privilege and hence was not concerned with making the point as to bur-
den of proof. Regarding this no further statement was made nor authority cited.
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pears from the report, no question as to burden of proof was involved nor did the
court otherwise consider it. Relying upon the language in the Hocppnwr case, the
majority of the court in the principal case decided that since it appeared from the
complaints that the occasion was a proper one for fair comment, the defendant was
relieved of any further burden and it devolved upon the plaintiffs "to show that the
defendants had gone beyond the bounds of fair criticism". 3  This, in effect, placed
upon the plaintiffs the entire burden of disproving, in the first instance, the affirma-
tive defense of fair comment. Given a principle so unstable in origin and unusual
in application, it seems proper to test its validity against the standard of previous
decisions in New York.
The general rule (if one is capable of formulation) may be said to be that the bur-
den of sustaining the affirmative of an issue rests upon the party who alleges the
facts which constitute that issue.4 Applying this principle to the law of libel, it has
been held in this state that the burden of proof in a plea of privilege is, in general,
upon the defendant,5 while the burden of proving the malice which destroys such
privilege is upon the plaintiff.6 Stated briefly the rules of the decided cases come to
this, that the plaintiff alleges a defamatory utterance and must prove it; the defend-
ant alleges the occasion was privileged and must prove it; and the plaintiff
rep)lies that the privilege has been destroyed by abuse and must prove it. Such is
the fundamental procedure in a case of the instant sort. It now becomes pertinent to
inquire into the elements which constitute the defense of fair comment.1
By definition a fair comment is composed of (1) a comment,8 (2) upon facts truly
stated,9 (3) concerning a matter of public interest, l0 (4) containing matter fairly
3. 250 App. Div. 625, 629, 295 N. Y. Supp. 219, 224 (1st Dep't 1937). Though not en-
tirely unambiguous, this statement by the court seems fairly open to the construction that
a prima facie defense of fair comment had been established by the allegations of the com-
plaint and therefore it now rested with plaintiff to destroy that defense.
4. Heinemann v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448 (1875); CHAm-mE5.,AYNE, HANDBOOIn ON Emir.c
(1919) § 396. See also, 5 WIGmoRz, EvmDNcz (2d ed. 1923) § 2486, wherein are discussed
difficulties attending any attempt to lay down a hard and fast rule governing the incidence
of the burden of proof.
5. Stuart v. Press Pub. Co., 83 App. Div. 467, 82 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't 1903); Tier-
ney v. Ruppert, 150 App. Div. 863, 866, 135 N. Y. Supp. 365, 368 (2d Dep't 1912) ; Magnus
v. New, 212 App. Div. 123, 124, 208 N. Y. Supp. 207, 208 (2d Dep't 1925).
6. Van Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190 (1858); Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 477
(1868); Byam v. Collins, 111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75 (1888); Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y.
517, 34 N. E. 342 (1893); Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N. Y. 488, 90 N. E. 1117 (1910).
See note (1928) 54 A. L. R. 1143.
7. It is submitted, in passing, that for present purposes it is immaterial whether the
defense of fair comment be considered as a privilege, or a right to be pleaded in the nature
of a justification. The rule which allocates the burden of its proof cannot be affected In
either event. See Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., Ltd., [19061 2 K. B. 627, 639;
Bingham v. Gaynor, 68 Misc. 565, 569, 125 N. Y. Supp. 216, 219 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
8. See Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 544, 235 N. Y. Supp. 340, 351 (1st
Dep't 1929); GATLmY, LIBEL AND SL.AIwER (2d ed. 1929) 361 et seq.; Veeder, Freedom of
Public Discussion (1910) 23 HARv. L. REv. 413, for discussions of the nature of comment
as opposed to statement of fact.
9. Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54 (N. Y. 1851); Briarcliff Lodge Hotel v. Citizen-Sentinel
Pub., Inc., 260 N. Y. 106, 118, 183 N. E. 193, 198 (1932); Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226
App. Div. 535, 544, 235 N. Y. Supp. 340, 351 (1st Dep't 1929). The leading English
authorities are collated by Veeder, supra note 8, at 423.
10. Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N. Y. 95, 99, 172 N. E. 139, 140 (1930);
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inferable from the facts reported,11 and (5) made without actual malice on the part
of the writer.' 2 The last mentioned element might perhaps more properly have been
omitted from the foregoing summary since, as seen above, it is the plainliFis task to
destroy the privilege by showing actual malice. But the burden of showing the other
four elements-and thus setting up a prima fade defense of fair comment-is with
the defendant. In the principal case the plaintiffs' complaints set forth, among other
things, that the defendants had made certain comments concerning a matter of pub-
lic interest (judicial proceeding) for the libelous nature of which plaintiffs see redress.
Thus only two of the elements of the defense were set forth by the plaintiff, leaving
the two most important elements of the defendant's plea absolutely lacking. Particu-
larly is it true that the facts upon which the defendant's comment was based must be
presented to the jury in such a light that they may conclude that the inference drawn
therefrom by the defendant was reasonable and therefore "fair" under all the cir-
cumstances. The burden of this justification properly rests on the defendant.
Hence, even though the general proposition that a defendant may take advan-
tage of any facts pleaded by the plaintiff13 may be agreed with,14 it is nevertheless
submitted that a valid defense of fair comment was not set up in the instant case 15
and therefore, the burden should not have been put upon the plaintiff to show
that defendant had exceeded the bounds of fair comment, until defendant himself
had set out those bounds by establishing a prima fade defense. Such was the sub-
stance of one of the dissenting opinions in the principal case, while the other criti-
cized the wisdom of the rule laid down by the majority. It would therefore seem
advisable that a principle so dubious in origin and provocative of such vigorous
dissent in application be thoroughly scrutinized by the courts before it be permitted to
become the settled law of this state.
M ORTGAGES-DEFICIENCY JUDGmIENT-JURY TrAL or GUAMNTOs' DEFzrmsz-
The guarantors of a debt, secured by a mortgage, are defendants in a foreclosure
action in which judgment is demanded for any deficiency which may result upon
sale of the mortgaged premises. They allege as defenses that the defendant mort-
gagor had, without their consent, waived payment of an interest installment, extended
Briarcliff Lodge Hotel v. Citizen-Sentinel Pub., Inc., 260 N. Y. 106, 118, 183 N. E. 193, 197
(1932); NFwEL, SLANDER Aim Li EL (4th ed. 1924) 516; Oceas, Lmzu sm Sr.Aamm (6th
ed. 1929) 169. See N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr (1930) § 337.
11. Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769, 122 Eng. Reprints 288 (Q. B. 1863) ; feri-
vale v. Carson, 20 Q. B. D. 275 (1S87); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 2S4 N. Y.
95, 105, 106, 172 N. E. 139, 142 (1930); Tanzer v. Crowley Pub. Corp., 240 App. Div. 203,
205, 268 N. Y. Supp. 620, 622 (4th Dep't 1934); SEEW&W, LmEL AiN SrM,'Do (1933) 234
(and cases there cited); Veeder, Freedom, of Public Discussion (1910) 23 Htnv. L. REv. 413.
12. Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N. Y. 95, 106, 172 N. E. 139, 142 (1930);
Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 547, 235 N. Y. Supp. 340, 354 (1st Dep't 1929).
But see the criticism of this doctrine as an anomaly in SEELarAN, LinEr tam ScL.Avn (1933)
§§ 234-235, and the defense of it in Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., Ltd., [1905] 2
K.. B., 627, 641.
13. Tierney v. Ruppert, 150 App. Div. 863, 859, 135 N. Y. Supp. 365, 369 (2d Dep't
1912).
14. But see, Eisenberg v. Reasenberg, 133 MHisc. 190, 231 N. Y. Supp. 49 (Sup. Ct.
1928).
15. Such a defense could not be satisfactorily established unless and until defendant had
pleaded and proved the four elements previously considered.
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the time for the payment of the interest and principal and altered the interest
rates thereby changing the terms of the original bond and allowing the mortgagors
to continue in default. On appeal from an order of the Appellate Division affirming
an order of the Special Term directing a jury trial of the issues raised by the
guarantors' defenses, held, three judges dissenting, that the defendants were not
entitled as of right to a jury trial of these issues under Sec. 429 of the Civil Practice
Act.1 Order reversed, motion denied. Jamaica Saving Banks v. M. S. Investing Co.
Inc. et al., 274 N. Y. 215, 8 N. E. (2d) 493 (1937).
Prior to the enactment of the Revised Statutes of 1830,2 a decree for a deficiency
could not be had in a foreclosure action but had'to be obtained in an action at law
on the bond.3 The court, in the case under consideration, answering the defendant's
contention that the State Constitution guaranteed them the right to a jury trial of
the issues,4 recalled that the Revised Statutes of 1830 had converted the action for
deficiency on a mortgage debt into an incidental phase of foreclosure proceedings.
The court acts upon the fundamental principle that a court of equity, having once
obtained jurisdiction of a cause, retains control of it generally, and awards com-
plete relief even though the rights of the parties are legal. Since an action to fore-
close a mortgage is equitable6 and the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury
1. A party entitled by the NEW YORK CONsrrrunoN to a trial by jury, on one or more
issues of fact, may apply for an order directing that such issues be stated for trial. N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. AcT (1921) § 429. Recent emergency legislation limiting recovery of deficiencies
on mortgage debts merely limits circumstances under which a recovery for deficiency may be
obtained and makes no fundamental change in the procedure to be followed in foreclosure.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1937) §§ 1077(a), 1077(h), 1083 (a), (b). Monaghan v. May, 242 App.
Div. 64, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475 (2d Dep't 1934), modified on other grounds, 242 App. Div. 733,
274 N. Y. Supp. 243 (2d Dep't 1934). Obiter Dictum (1936) 5 FORDAi. L. REv. 278.
2. 2 N. Y. REV. STAT. 191 (1829) art. 6, §§ 151-161. Section 152 empowers a court of
equity, in a foreclosure proceeding, to decree and direct payment of any balance on the
mortgage debt remaining unsatisfied after a sale of the premises, where such balance Is
recoverable at law. N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr (1921) §§ 1077, 1078, 1083.
3. Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 1818); Jones v. Conde, 6 Johns. Ci.
77 (N. Y. 1822) ; 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2206: "A judgment for a deficiency
can be rendered by a court only by virtue of a statute."
4. N. Y. CONST. (1821) Art. 1. § 2, provided that: "The trial by jury in all cases In
which it has heretofore been used shall remain inviolate forever." See 4 CARMODY, N. Y.
PRActiCE (2d ed. 1930) § 1169.
5. Citing and quoting from Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 275, 31 N. E. 1100 (1892);
Reichert v. Stillwell, 172 N. Y. 83, 64 N. E. 790 (1902); Dudley v. Congregation of Third
Order of St. Francis, 138 N. Y. 451, 34 N. E. 281 (1893).
Since the right of the mortgagee to deficiency judgment in the foreclosure action is purely
the creation of a statute, it is debatable whether a jury trial on such a question may be
denied. It has been held that where trial by jury was a matter of right before the passage
of the state constitution, it cannot be impaired by legislative act. Steck v. Colorado Fuel Co.,
142 N. Y. 236, 247, 37 N. E. 1, 5 (1894). The only New York case prior to the present
decision, which expressly denied to the mortgagee any right to jury trial on the matter of
deficiency, contained no argument or citations on the point. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co.
v. Nelson, 8 Hun 21 (N. Y. 1876). Carroll v. Diemel, 95 N. Y. 252 (1884), which is relied
upon by the majority opinion in the principal case, merely declared that since there was
a possibility that there would be no deficiency, the mortgagor was not entitled to jury trial
on the ground that the foreclosure action was one solely for a money judgment. N. Y. Civ.
PRAG. AcT (1921) § 425.
6. The action to foreclose a mortgage is an equitable one. Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3
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has no reference to actions over which equity may exercise jurisdiction,7 a trial
by jury was denied.
The broad equitable principle of complete relief may be found repeated in a
multitude of cases and by numerous authorities.8 It is an outgrowth of the maxim
that equity will prevent a multiplicity of actions.9 Both of these doctrines have
been the source of a great deal of controversy.
Examination of the cases and other authorities in which the equitable doctrine of
complete relief has been considered, reveals the fact that the principle has been
applied chiefly to actions asking for discovery, accounting, injunction, specific per-
formance, reformation and rescission.' 0 In such cases, the legal relief granted is, in
Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 1818); Young v. Vail, 29 N. Al. 324, 222 Pac. 912 (1924); 8 CAn-
a ODv, N. Y. PRACTrcE (2d ed. 1930) § 769; 3 Jon.s, MoRTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1840.
7. Cohnan v. Dixon, 50 N. Y. 572 (1872); Powell v. Waldron, 89 N. Y. 328 (1832);
Kennedy v. Apgor, 93 N. Y. 539 (1883); Wright v. Van Nostrand, 94 N. Y. 32 (1833); Acher
v. Leland, 109 N. Y. 5, 15 N. E. 743 (1888); Randall v. Randall, 114 N. Y. 499, 21 N. E.
1020 (1889); Schllinger Fire Proof Cement Co. v. Arnott, 152 N. Y. 584,46 N. E. 956 (1897);
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1921) § 427; 4 CAQuonY, N. Y. Pmanc (2d ed. 1930) p. 1172; 4
WArE, N. Y. PAc-rcE (3d ed. 1936) § 6.
The principle is aptly illustrated by actions such as bills of peace. Equity having obtained
jurisdiction of a cause merely for the purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, the
right to jury trial is not enforcible even though the action, if standing alone, would be at law.
8. Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N. E. 420 (1935);
Carpenter v. Osborne, 102 N. Y. 552 (1886); Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry., 129 N. Y. 274,
29 N. E. 315 (1891); Wyoming Sales Coal Co. v. Smith-Pochahontas, 105 W. Va. 610, 144
S. E. 410 (1928), (Cases and authorities cited); 1 Po.nmoy, Equrrz JunusPRuD=Ecm (4th ed.
1918) §§ 231, 232.
9. Farrell v. City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 353, 178 Pac. 740, 741 (1919). 1
Po~a roy, EQurTy Ju isPRuDEcz (4th ed. 1918) § 243.
10. The New Jersey Chancery Court has refused to accede to the doctrine of complete
relief. Loder v. McGovern, 48 N. J. Eq. 275, 22 AUt. 199 (1891); Shaw v. Beaumont Co.,
88 N. J. Eq. 333, 102 AU. 151 (1917). Loder v. McGovern was followed in Harlow v.
Pulsifer, 122 Me. 472, 120 AUt. 621 (1923).
In California the question as to whether damages may be awarded in an action to enjoin
nuisance has not been passed upon in the highest court. There is conflict in the lower
jurisdictions. Farrell v. City of Ontario, 39 CaL App. 351, 178 Pac. 740 (1919); Union Oil
Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 66 P. (2d) 1215 (Cal. App. 1937); 1 Pozimoy, EQurrz Juius-
PRUDE-CE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 245, 2511,, 2514, 269, has been the leading authority for the
rule that a common question of law or fact is sufficient ground for equity to entertain a bill
of peace. But vigorous opposition has developed, headed by Tribette v. Illinois C. R. Co.,
70 Biss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1892); aff'd in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Williamson,
101 Biss. 1, 57 So. 559 (1910). The rule laid down in these cases declares that there must
be some additional, recognized ground of equity jurisdiction, or a common right or title
involved, or some community of interest in the subject matter of the controversy in order
to warrant a joinder of several actions in a bill of peace.
In the United States Supreme Court, each case rests upon its particular merits. Hale v.
Allison, 188 U. S. 56 (1903). And in New York, before statute settled the controversy [N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. Acr (1935) § 258], the cases were in conflict. New York & N. H. R. R. v.
Schyler, 17 N. Y. 592 (1858); Boston & Mlaine R. R. v. Delaware & Hudson Co, 263 N. Y.
382, 197 N. E. 321 (1935). See (1936) 5 FoaDAar L. REv. 171.
The problem is fully discussed in Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A.
4th, 1931); First State Bank v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A. 8th,
1933); Comment (1932) 16 MhNN. L. Rwv 679
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the majority of instances, in the form of pecuniary damages which are awarded either
as incidental to the equitable relief granted or (less frequently) are allowed as
sole relief where application of the equitable remedy is impossible or impracticable.11
In these cases, the determination of such issues as were sufficient to form a basis
for the equitable relief asked in the petition was the only determination the court
was called upon to make. The award of money damages required no further finding
of fact but merely an arithmetical computation of the value of the injury suffered.
Having determined that the defendant is guilty of the wrong requiring equitable
relief, it follows without question that the rights of the plaintiff have been injured.
All that remains is for the court to compute the amount of this damage and the award
is made as an incident to the equitable decree.12 This is so in all the cases quoted
by the majority opinion in the instant case in support of the principle.18 Indeed,
the case of- Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., cited and quoted therein, contains a
clear exposition of this argument.1 4
In the present case it would seem that the issues presented in the defenses of the
guarantors were not merely incidental to the questions raised by the foreclosure
action. The court had a sufficient basis for a judgment of foreclosure against the
mortgagor without concerning itself with the issues raised by the guarantors. The
adjudication of such issues as were sufficient to form the basis for the foreclosure
judgment did not ipso facto determine the issues raised by the guarantors. These.
defenses, relating to their liability as guarantors, represented, it would seem,
separate questions of fact for the determination of which a jury trial was proper.
The issues sufficient for the court to decide that judgment of foreclosure should
be granted against the mortgagor were such issues as: the amount of the debt;
whether or not it was secured by the mortgage; the terms of payment and the
rates of interest; and even their extension and alteration. But these were distinct
and separate from the question of whether or not the guarantors had consented
to or foregone rights arising from such extensions and alterations. It is submitted
that such question is not so related to the primary phase of the foreclosure action
as to come within the rule of incidental relief which is to be found generally in
the cases and authorities heretofore indicated.
It is a recognized rule, moreover, in actions which involve bills of peace, that
multifariousness in the causes of action concerned will defeat the bill. In order that
11. See note 8, supra.
12. The amount of damage is not and never was an issuable fact and the Constitution
guarantees the right to a trial by jury only in respect of "issues of fact" In civil and
criminal cases. Beekman v. Saratoga T. R. Co., 3 Paige 47 (N. Y. 1831); Livingston v. New
York, 8 Wend. 85 (N. Y. 1831).
13. Cogswell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 105 N. Y. 319, 11 N. E. 518 (1887) ; Lynch
v. Metropolitan El. Ry., 129 N. Y. 274, 29 N. E. 315 (1891); Shepherd v. Manhattan Ry.,
131 N. Y. 215, 30 N. E. 187 (1892) (actions wherein damages for past injuries were awarded
as incidental to injunctive relief against nuisance); Van Rensselaer v. Van Rensselaer, 113
N. Y. 207, 21 N. E. 75 (1889) (accounting action wherein the account was found to have
been rendered and a simple money judgment was awarded).
14. In Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry., 129 N. Y. 274, 29 N. E. 315 (1891), the court
makes a distinction between questions of fact and a mere computation of damage after
the facts causing the damage have been decided by the court in considering the question as
to whether or not a nuisance, requiring injunctive relief, existed. "It does not seem to me
that any issue of fact as to damage remains. That was necessarily decided in the action, and
all that remains is to fix its amount, and I do not think that the constitutional provision was
aimed at such a proceeding." Gray, J., in Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry., supra at 283, 29
N. E. at 318.
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equity may take jurisdiction over separate causes of action it must at least be
shown that such causes arose from the same transaction and that there is a common
question of law and fact involved."; Again, where a legal counterclaim is interposed
to an equitable cause of action, the defendant has a right to a jury trial on the
counterclaim. 16 Therefore, even if it be conceded, that with regard to the mort-
gagor in a foreclosure action, the deficiency judgment against the mortgagor merely
takes the form of a computation of damages, 17 still, where, as in the principal case,
a guarantor alleges as defenses facts entirely separate and distinct from the inortgage
transaction, it is submitted that he should be granted a jury trial on the issues pre-
sented by such defenses.
NEGLIGENE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-BURSTING BorTLEs.-Plaintiff brought suit
against the defendent for damages on account of injuries sustained from the ex-
plosion of a bottle of Coca Cola, which he had placed in an ice box in the restaurant
of his employer. On appeal, from a verdict for the plaintiff, one judge dissenting,
held: in a case where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable the jury is author-
ized to find a verdict for the plaintiff unless the defendant establishes due care in all
respects or affirmatively shows that some external cause produced the accident without
his negligence. Judgment affirmed, Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Crane,
190 S. E. 879 (Ga. 1937).
The phrase res ipsa loquitur is old in the law, but the wide development of the
doctrine is an outgrowth of the rather recent industrial expansion and the vast in-
crease in the manufacture of articles not inherently dangerous, which become dan-
gerous when negligently manufactured. 1 In general, there are three requirements
for the application of res ipsa loqudtur.2 (1) The plaintiff must have been injured
by an instrumentality whose nature is such that injury is not to be expected in the
absence of negligence. (2) At the time of the injury both the inspection and user
must have been in the control of the party charged. (3) The injury must have hap-
pened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the injured person. It
should be noted with respect to the second requirement, that it has been held suffi-
cient if it appears that the injurious agency was in the control of the defendant at
the time of the negligent act which caused the injury, even though it was out of the
15. First State Bank v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 F. (2d) 585 (1933); Welninger v.
Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 EII. 584, 195 N. E. 420 (1935); 1 Pomrmoy, EQurry Jums-
PRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 251/, 269.
16. Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N. Y. 391, 115 N. E. 993 (1917); Maag v.
Maag, 193 App. Div. 759, 184 N. Y. Supp. 630 (1st Dep't 1920) ; Kupper v. Thompson, 227
App. Div. 516, 238 N. Y. Supp. 222 (2d. Dep't 1929); Font v. Wolfe, 231 App. Div. 11, 245
N. Y. Supp. 505 (4th Dep't 1930). It must be admitted, however, that it has been held
that a defendant is not entitled to a separate trial of his counterclaim if it is one which would
not entitle him to an independent judgment against plaintiff, i.e., one whose effect is exhausted
by simply defeating plaintiff's claim. Bennett v. Edison, 164 N. Y. 131. 58 N. E. 7 (1900).
17. Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 27S, 31 N. E. 1100 (1892); Reichert v. Stillwell, 172 N. Y.
83, 64 N. E. 790 (1902); Dudley v. Congregation of Third Order of St. Francis, 138 N. Y.
451, 34 N. E. 281 (1893).
1. 5 Wioapo-, EvinDcr (2d ed. 1923) § 2509, n. 2.
2. Ross v. Double Shoals Cotton AMIs, 140 N. C. 115, 52 S. E. 121 (1905); S Wioarz,
EviDNcm (2d ed. 1923) § 2509, n. 2.
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defendant's control when the injury occurred.8 The purpose of the courts in invok-
ing the doctrine is primarily to equalize the position of the contending parties with
regard to the proof of negligence. It permits an inference of negligence to be drawn
from the circumstantial evidence offered by the plaintiff, when he establishes the
presence of the above mentioned elements in his case, because direct evidence of the
manner in which the injury occurred is not accessible to him.4
Whether, in the case at bar, the first of the three requirements is satisfied depends
upon the correctness of applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a bursting bottle.
In accordance with the long established Georgia ruler it was applied in the case at
bar. However, in the majority of jurisdictions,0 possibly including New York,7 the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when it is shown merely that the ex-
plosion occurred. They feel that the bursting of a bottle may reasonably be ex-
pected even without negligence. Kentucky also refuses to apply res ipsa loquitur to
the bursting of a single bottles but does apply to the bursting of twenty-seven bottles.0
The reasoning of the Kentucky court in holding that the breaking of one bottle is not
an event which could occur only from the negligence of the bottler, but the break-
ing of twenty-seven bottles under a variety of circumstances, at the same place and
during the day the plaintiff was injured, could not happen except from negligence,
seems a much sounder application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur than the arbi-
trary inclusion of a single bursting bottle by the Georgia courts. The application of
the doctrine should depend on a consideration of all surrounding circumstances since
the probability of negligence in each situation will vary with the facts. Where the
facts make an inference of negligence (in the absence of explanation) probable to
the reasonable man,10 then it should be applied. Such facts may surround the
bursting of even one bottle and most likely are present on the bursting of a number
3. Coldman & Freiman v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 AtI. 866 (1922); Payne v. Rome
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. 1087 (1912).
4. See Stewart v. Vanderventer Carpet Co., 138 N. C. 60, 63, 50 S. E. 563, 564 (1905);
HARIzR, TORTS (1933) 185; 5 WiGopo., EviDEams (2d. 1923) § 2509. See Prosser, The
Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1936) 20 lMnr. L. Rav. 241, 243.
5. Georgia has long held res ipsa loquitur applicable to bursting bottles. In 1912 the
Georgia Court of Appeals in Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 762
73 S. E. 1087, 1087 (1912) said in reference to the breaking of a single bottle, "If the
plaintiff can recover at all he can do so only upon an application of the maxim res ipsa
loquitur. The occurrence was unusual. Bottles filled with a harmless and refreshing
beverage do not ordinarily explode."
6. Wheeler v. Laurel Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743 (1916); Dail v. Taylor,
151 N. C. 284, 66 S. E. 135 (1909); Duerler.Mfg. Co. v. Duilnig, 832 S. W. 889 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1904).
7. Glasser v. Seitz, 35 Misc. 341, 341, 71 N. Y. Supp. 942, 943 (1901), a lower court
case in New York involving the explosion of a bottle of seltzer water, the court said: "They
Esyphons of seltzer water] are certainly in as common use as steam boilers and gas, and an
explosion of a steam boiler or of gas does not necessarily create an inference of negligence
sufficient to fix liability on the defendant.... But it does not necessarily follow that the
vendor of these commodities in such bottles or barrels is.liable for the explosion, in the ab-
sence of misconduct on his part, which misconduct must be affirmatively proved."
8. Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S. W. (2d) 910 (1935).
9. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 18, 282 S. W. 778 (1926).
10. In Gabraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234, 196 N. E. 36, 38 (1935), the court said,
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not an arbitrary rule. It is rather a common-sense ap-
praisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence."
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of bottles. But proof merely of the explosion of a single bottle does not demand an
inference of the bottler's negligence as the only reasonable and probable e-xplanation.
Conceding that the second and third requirements noted above appear in the instant
action,11 it will follow that the plaintiff succeeds in making out a res ipsa loquitur
case. Where the plaintiff has done this, there is much confusion in the various states
as to the effect of the application of the maxim. The majority of' states seem to hold
that res ipsa loquitur permits the jury to infer from the plaintiff's case that the de-
fendant has been negligent, if the defendant does not submit evidence. Other states,
including New York, apply the doctrine as a rebuttable presumption, entitling the
plaintiff to a directed verdict if the defendant fails to submit evidence. 13 Where,
however, the defendant does submit evidence, the courts are in hopeless confusion as
to the resulL14 In general, the presumption of negligence is defeated, 15 but the
probative value of the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence remains and the defendant
is required to produce such evidence that, upon the whole case, there is not a pre-
ponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiff's allegation of negligence. The instant
case seems to run counter to this rule. It does not seem to require that the plaintiff
prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. From the evidence submitted to
the court by the defendant, two equally probable theories of the cause of the injury
could be drawn. The first was set out by the majority and was based on the evi-
dence which admitted the possibility that a measuring device used in the bottling of
the Coca-Cola might get clogged. 10 The second theory, that the injury might have
been caused by the use of a bottle, weakened by washing with caustic soda, and
that the use of such a bottle would not have been an act of carelessness on the
part of the defendant was pointed out by the minority.17  Permitting the verdict
for the plaintiff to stand, seems to overlook the fact that the application of res ipsa
loquitur merely enables the plaintiff to secure his verdict on circumstantial evidence.
The long established rule,' 8 as the minority asserts, is that such circumstantial
11. See Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 190 S. E. 879, 834 (Ga. 1937).
12. Stebel v. Connecticut Co., 90 Conn. 24, 6 At. 171 (1915). Cf. Feeney v. N. Y.
Waist Co., 108 Conn. 115, 142 At. 812 (1928); Leighton v. Dean, 117 Me. 40, 102 AUt.
565 (1917); Keithley v. Hethringer, 133 Minn. 36, 157 N. W. 897 (1916); Womble v.
Merchants Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474, 47 S. E. 493 (1909); St. Mary's Gas Co. v.
Brodbeck, 119 Ohio St. 423, 151 N. E. 323 (1926); Houston v. Bruch, 66 Vt. 331, 29
AtL 380 (1894). See Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1936) 20
MmnzN. L. Rxv. 241, 251 for a discussion of the views of the various states.
13. Hart v. Washington Park Club, 157 Ill. 9, 41 N. E. 620 (1895); Terre Haute &
I. R. Co. v. Sheeko, 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434 (1900) ; Chesapake Iron Works v. Hoch child,
Kohn & Co., 119 Md. 303, 86 AtI. 345 (1913); Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 149 N. E.
859 (1925); Richmond Ry. & Elect. Co. v. Hudgins, 100 Va. 409, 410 S. E. 736 (1902).
Cf. Pindell v. Rubenstein, 139 Md. 567, 115 Atl. 859 (1921).
14. See Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California (1934) 10 So.
Can'. L. Rrv. 166, for the confusion that exists in California alone.
15. Huscher v. N. Y. & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 158 App. Div. 422, 143
N. Y. Supp. 639 (2d Dep't 1913); 5 Wxaaom, EvmNzcE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 249D, 2491,
n. 2. See Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Laue upon a Burden of Proof
(1920) 63 U. or PA. L. REV. 307; Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and
Burden of Proof (1933) 47 HARV. L. REV. 59.
16. See Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 190 S. E. 879, 884 (Ga. 1937).
17. Id. at 894.
18. Lopez v. Campbell, 163 N. Y. 340, 57 N. E. 501 (1900); Carr v. Donner, 207 App.




evidence creates no preponderance in favor of the plaintiff if it is as consistent with
a theory exculpating the defendant as it is with a theory pointing to his fault.10 The
inference of negligence is not then a more probable inference than the inference of
due care20 and, even though it is certain that the plaintiff is not negligent, he should
recover. He has not borne his burden. If he is permitted to recover he is placed
in a better position in a res ipsa loquitur case when he does not know the true cause
of the occurrence than in the ordinary case where he does. The new Georgia exten-
sion seems unwise.
OFICERs-SI'ERiF's LIABILITY ZOR DEPUTY's NEGLIGENCE.-The plaintiff brought
an action against a sheriff and his deputy for injuries occasioned by the negligence of
the deputy while driving the sheriff's car, on his way to investigate a reported mur-
der. The deputy had permission to use the vehicle upon both his own and the
sheriff's business. The sheriff's demurrer as to the cause of action against him was
sustained. On appeal, held, the sheriff was responsible only for those official acts of
his deputy done in the course of the sheriff's business; here, the official act had not
as yet begun. Judgment affirmed. Humphrey v. Ownby et al., 104 S. W. (2d) 398
(Springfield Ct. of App. Mo., 1937).
Although public officers are generally not responsible for the wrongful acts of their
subordinates,' sheriffs have not been so fortunate with reference to the acts of their
deputies.2 Today, most states have statutes codifying the common law,8 which make
sheriffs liable when their deputies wrongfully injure another while engaged in the
performance of an official act. But just as there is in the related field of master.
servant law4 the difficult question of determining when a servant is acting within
the scope of his employment in order to fix liability upon his master,G so also the
19. See Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 190 S. E. 879, 895 (Ga. 1937).
20. In New York, if defendant proves the accident might have happened from a cause
other than the defendant's negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 37, 86 N. E. 805 (1909).
1. Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 507 (1888); Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632 (N. Y.
1849); see Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83, 100, 10 Atl. 499, 504 (1886).
2. Sheriffs are liable for the official acts of their deputies. Prosser v. Coots, So Mich.
262, 15 N. W. 448 (1883); Rider v. Chick, 59 N. H. S0 (1879); Ross v. Campbell, 19 Hun
615 (N. Y. 1880).
3. For statutes typical of such codification, see IowA CoDe (1935) § 5187; Omo GEN. CODE
(Page, 1926) § 2831; R. I. GE~r. LAws (1923) § 4821. In Washington, a sheriff's liability is
limited to the extent of his bond. WAsH. Rxv. STAT. Ar. (Remington, 1932) §, 4160, Coles
v. McNamara, 131 Wash. 377, 230 Pac. 430 (1924).
4. It has been said that the deputy derives his authority from the law. He is neither
the servant nor the agent of the sheriff. The deputy's acts may make the sheriff liable be-
cause of the official relation existing between them. Lyman v. Holmes, 88 Vt. 431, 92 Ati.
829 (1915).
5. Many authorities admit the difficulty of the question. "The utmost that can ordi-
narily be said is that a servant is acting within the course of his employment when he is
engaged in doing, for his master, either the act consciously and specifically directed or any
act which can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or
attribute of that act or a natural, direct and logical result of it." 2 MEC1EX,, AoENCY (2d
ed. 1914) § 1879. See Bryan v. Bunis, 208 App. Div. 389, 391, 203 N. Y. Supp. 634, 635
(4th Dep't 1924); RESTATEMENT, AGENcy (1933) § 228.
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question of determining when a deputy is acting officially has not yet been answered
satisfactorily. It has been said that a deputy acts officially when he acts "under
color of office" 6 and "the test as to whether the officer is acting by virtue of his
office, is whether he is armed with a valid writ or has authority to make the
arrest without a writ under a statute."7  But the adoption of this woefully in-
adequate test is as far as the courts have gone. Because of it, the general trend
of decisions has tended to narrow the boundaries of official action.8 In the
instant case, for example, the court decided that no official act was in progress while
the deputy was driving his car to the scene of a reported crime.
The soundness of the decision is still a point of real interest even in those states
which have statutes covering this general type of situation 0 These statutes impose
liability on the owner of a vehicle when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
person to whom the vehicle is loaned. Typical of these is the New York statute 0
whereby "the owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for death or injuries to persons
or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such vehicle . . . . in the
business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the
same with the permission, &press or implied, of such owner." It is true, therefore,
that the precise facts of the instant case would offer no difficulty where such a statute
exists. Under it, any person who borrows a car with the owner's permission becomes
the agent of the owner and makes the owner responsible for his negligence. n The
deputy, having the sheriff's permission to use the car, could therefore impose liability
upon the latter even when the car was being used on the deputy's personal business
and not officially. However, under the similar statutes in the various jurisdictions,
6. See Knowlton v. Bartlett, 1 Pick. 271, 274 (Bass. 1822).
7. See Jones v. Van Bever, 164 Ky. S0, 92, 174 S. W. 795, 799 (1915), where a deputy
was already at the place of arrest. Even when a deputy had a writ for the arrest of e-
caped prisoners, it was held that he was not acting under color of office while engaged
in going to the place where they were supposed to be. Usrey v. Yarnell, 181 Ark. 804, 27
S. W. (2d) 988 (1930).
8. The sheriff was not held liable in these cases. Chandler v. Rutherford, 101 Fed. 774 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1900) (where deputy shot plaintiff for purpose of arresting him); Jordan v. Neer,
34 Okla. 400, 125 Pac. 1117 (1912) (where deputy killed plaintiff's husband); Maddox v.
Hudgeons, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 291, 72 S. W. 414 (1903) (where deputy instructed constable
to arrest plaintiff).
9. See CA. CM. CODE (Deering, 1935) § 1714%; IOwA CoDE (1924) § 5026; .ma.. Sr,%T.
(Mlason, Supp. 1933) § 2720-104; N. Y. Vnmcrm ATD TMMC Lw (1929) § 59; R. L Pun.
LAws (1927) c. 1040, § 3. Canada has also imposed liability on the owner of the auto-
mobile for the negligence of the driver. ONT. Rav. STAT. (1914) c. 207, § 19, McFee v. Joss,
27 0. W. N. (Canada 1924) 81. The Mfichigan legislature went so far as to attempt to
charge the owner with liability for all injuries occasioned by the negligence of the driver
of the car, except where it was stolen. Johnson v. Sergeant, 168 Mlich. 444, 134 N. W. 465
(1912). But this statute was ruled to be unconstitutional. Daugherty v. Thomas, 174
Mlich. 371, 140 N. W. 615 (1913). Mlichigan's present statute provides that the owner is
not liable when the machine is driven without his consent or knowledge. Mxcm. Co!zp.
LAW (1915) § 4825, Hatter v. Dodge Bros., 202 Mich. 97, 167 N. W. 935 (1918).
10. N. Y. V.Hicr AwD TPA=c L.%w (1929) § 59.
11. Psota v. Long Island R. Co., 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927); Fluege v. Coudert,
244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 6S3 (1927). An employer is liable for the acts of his servant upon
the ground of agency only. As there is no agency in fact in such situations, in order to
give effect to the statute, an agency is constructed. Psota v. Long Island R. Co, siu ra,
at 393, 159 N. E. at 181.
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an owner may qualify the permission given;' 2 if he does, he is not liable for any use
beyond that qualification.' 3 Many of the cases falling under the statute involve the
relationship of master and servant, and disclose a general qualification made by the
master when giving the servant the use of his car; the qualification that the servant
use it only within the scope of his employment. 14 This same qualified permission
might be given by a sheriff when he instructs his deputy to use the car on official
business alone. When this qualification appears, even in states where the statutes
are in force, we are remitted to the question proposed in the instant case--when is
a deputy acting officially?
A glance at the reasoning behind the theory of vicarious liability may help in our
judgment of the instant decision. A sheriff has been made responsible for the official
acts of his deputies on grounds of public policy.' 5 It has been reasoned that since
a sheriff has the power to appoint his deputies, this is the best method of preventing
him from abusing such power. It is submitted, that if this theory is to be effectuated,
a sounder holding in the instant case would have declared the deputy to be acting
"officially" even when en route to the scene of a reported crime. The necessities of
modem pursuit of criminals involving the use of high-powered vehicles, make a
careless operator a menace to the public. If held responsible for their deputies'
driving when on their way to perform arrests or other official acts, sheriffs would be
more cautious in their selections. Deputies sworn into office in times of emergency,
as in strike situations where a variety of duties requires travelling in motor vehicles,
would be more carefully chosen.
Considering the object of the deputy in the instant case in making the trip,10 the
court might have decided that the act was in furtherance of the sheriff's business and
was therefore "official". Travelling by car in order to act as sheriff should be con-
sidered as part of the deputy's work.
12. Where a borrower was instructed to use a car within certain geographical limits,
the owner would not be liable for an accident occurring outside those limits. Chaka v.
Vandenberg, 252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E. 103 (1929). See Haggard v. Frick, 6 Cal. App. (2d)
392, 394, 44 P. (2d) 447, 448 (1935); Guerin v. Mongeon, 49 R. I. 414, 417, 143 Ati. 674,
675 (1928).
13. The qualification, however, in order to be effective, must refer to the use of the
car rather than to the method of operation. For example, an instruction to the borrower
to drive slowly, if broken, would not discharge the owner's liability. This seemingly arbi-
trary distinction was made in Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N. Y. 211, 179 N. E. 389 (1932). See
(1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 512.
14. For a discussion of the theory behind the master's liability, see Douglas, Vicarious
Liability and Administration of Risk (1928) 38 YALn L. J. $84; TIrANY, Aoamcy (Powell's
2d ed. 1924) §§ 100-105; HARER, ToRTS (1933) § 291.
15. See Hanratty v. Godfrey, 44 Ohio App. 360, 363, 184 N. E. 842 (1932).
16. Such a consideration serves as a test in New York today in the field of master-
servant relations. If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, le is in
the course of his employment, although he is serving at the same time some purpose of his
own. In order to hold the employer liable, there should be an inference that the trip would
have been made even though the private errand had been cancelled; that the trip would
not have been made had the official errand been cancelled. Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251
N. Y. 90, 167 N. E. 181 (1929).
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